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In the Republic’s image of  the Divided Line, Plato divides belief  
into two species: pistis and eikasia. Pistis is a direct grasp of  sens­
ible objects and eikasia is an indirect grasp of  them through their 
‘images’ or ‘likenesses’ (εἰκόνες), namely: ‘shadows, then reflec­
tions, . . . and everything of  that kind’ (τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς 
ὕδασι ϕαντάσματα καὶ . . . πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον; Rep. 6, 510 a 1–3). For what 
appears to be a fundamental epistemological distinction, this is 
puzzling: what is so significant about beliefs about shadows and 
reflections? While there is no consensus, something of  a majority 
view has emerged, which I’ll call the ‘standard reading’. This read­
ing makes two distinct claims. First, that eikasia with respect to 
shadows and reflections—sensory eikasia—is mistaking an image 
for that of  which it is an image; for example, mistaking a shadow 
for the object that casts it. Second, it adds that what Plato is really 
interested in is an ethical kind of  eikasia, and it offers a separate 
account of  what this is: the error of  unreflectively accepting popu­
lar or influential ethical opinions.
I am going to argue that the standard reading fails, primarily 
because there is no viable way to connect the two types of  eikasia it 
introduces, sensory eikasia and ethical eikasia: the first says noth­
ing about ethics; the second says nothing about images. I will argue 
for a more economical account of  ethical eikasia: it is the same as 
eikasia with respect to sensible images like shadows and reflections; 
the only difference is that the relevant images include representa­
tions of  value properties. This requires us to accept that the con­
tents of  perception extend as far as value properties, and that, I’ll 
argue, is exactly Plato’s view in the Republic. Once we take this 
step, we open the way for an account of  eikasia that integrates far 
better with the Republic as a whole. The standard reading gives 
eikasia a comparatively minor role in the Republic and one that is 
largely detached from the dialogue’s major theoretical themes. In 
contrast, I will argue that eikasia plays an essential role in explain­
ing the origin and prevalence of  ethical error—and, consequently, 
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in explaining why there is a pressing need for knowledge of  the 
Forms and a society ruled by philosophers—and that it does so in 
a way that draws on the full range of  explanatory tools developed 
in the Republic, from its metaphysics to its psychology.
1. Eikasia and the Cave allegory
Before attempting an account of  eikasia, one needs to decide whether 
or not it is represented in Plato’s Cave allegory. I believe that it is, 
and in this I stand with the standard reading against its main rival, 
which sees eikasia as a way of  studying an original through its image.1 
Importantly, the disagreement here is only derivatively about eika-
sia: the real disagreement concerns how the two readings interpret 
the Line and Cave, and especially the relationship between them. 
This makes it impossible to compare critically the two readings 
without defending an interpretation of  the Line and Cave, which is 
a task that would require its own paper. Here, then, I will simply 
explain the assumptions behind each reading.
Consider our most basic evidence. Plato first describes eikasia 
during his account of  the two lower sections of  his Line analogy:
1 This reading was recently restated and defended by Y. H. Dominick, ‘Seeing 
Through Images: The Bottom of  Plato’s Divided Line’ [‘Images’], Journal of  the 
History of  Philosophy, 48 (2010), 1–13. Other explicit defenders include J. L. Stocks, 
‘The Divided Line of  Plato Rep. VI’, Classical Quarterly, 5 (1911), 73–88; A. S. 
Ferguson, ‘Plato’s Simile of  Light. Part II: The Allegory of  the Cave (Continued)’, 
Classical Quarterly, 16 (1922), 15–28, and ‘Plato’s Simile of  Light Again’ [‘Simile’], 
Classical Quarterly, 28 (1934), 190–210; and J.  Klein, A Commentary on Plato’s 
Meno (Chapel Hill, 1965), 114, and the authors mentioned in n. 5 would have reason 
to be sympathetic. The remaining views of  eikasia—those that cannot be identified 
with either rival—are more heterogeneous, but there is a rough third grouping, 
which includes the reading I’ll defend. These readings assume, like the standard 
reading, that eikasia is represented in the Cave but they offer more phenomenal 
interpretations of  ‘images’. Some of  its clearer members are H. J. Paton, ‘Plato’s 
Theory of  EIKASIA’ [‘Eikasia’], Proceedings of  the Aristotelian Society, 22 (1922), 
69–104; J. R. S. Wilson, ‘The Contents of  the Cave’, Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, 
suppl. vol., 2 (1976), 117–27; J. S. Morrison, ‘Two Unresolved Difficulties in the 
Line and Cave’ [‘Difficulties’], Phronesis, 22 (1977), 212–31; and most recently 
J. Moss, ‘Plato’s Appearance/Assent Account of  Belief’ [‘Assent’], Proceedings of  
the Aristotelian Society, 114 (2014), 1–27, who in many ways revives and updates 
Paton’s reading. Moss is an interesting contemporary contrast to my view. While we 
begin with substantial theoretical agreement, especially about images and their 
 general role in cognition, we reach very different views about what eikasia is: see 
nn. 17, 32, and 52.
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καί σοι ἔσται σαϕηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαϕείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον 
τμῆμα εἰκόνες, λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι 
ϕαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ ϕανὰ συνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ 
τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. . . . τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς 
ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ ϕυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος. (Rep. 6, 509 d 9–510 a 6)
In terms now of  relative clarity and obscurity, you will have as one section 
of  the visible, images [εἰκόνας]. By images I mean, first, shadows, then 
reflections in bodies of  water and in all close­packed, smooth, and shiny 
materials, and everything of  that kind, if  you understand. . . . In the other 
section of  the visible, put that which it [sc. an image] is like—that is, the 
animals around us, every plant, and the whole class of  manufactured 
things.2
Visible objects3 have different degrees of  ‘clarity’, depending on 
whether they are sensible ‘images’ or their originals. A few lines 
later, we learn that this is a division in the ‘opinable’ (τὸ δοξαστόν, 
6, 510 a 8–10), and it corresponds to a division between two kinds 
of  belief, eikasia and pistis:4
καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα 
λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν 
ἀπόδος, καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν . . . (6, 511 d 6–e 2)
Join me, then, in taking these four conditions in the soul as corresponding 
to the four subsections of  the line: noēsis for the highest, dianoia for the 
second, pistis for the third, and eikasia for the last.5
2 Unless otherwise noted, the text of  the Republic is the OCT edition of  Slings 
(Oxford, 2003). Translations are adapted, at times significantly, from Reeve, Plato: 
Republic (Hackett, 2004). Translations of  other texts of  Plato are adapted from 
J. M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Hackett, 1997).
3 Standing for sensible objects generally. See Rep. 7, 524 c 13, in context, and 
J. T. Bedu­Addo, ‘Διάνοια and the Images of  Forms in Plato’s Republic VI–VII’, 
Platon, 31 (1979), 89–110 at 93, for discussion.
4 Given the slight differences in their usages in English, I will sometimes use 
‘opinion’ and sometimes ‘belief’ (and occasionally ‘judgement’), without intending 
to attribute any corresponding distinction to Plato. In all cases, they refer to that 
which eikasia and pistis are kinds of, which Plato usually calls doxa.
5 See also Rep. 7, 533 e 3–534 a 2, where eikasia’s status as a species of  belief  
(δόξα) is more explicit. The description of  eikasia as an affection or condition (πάθημα) 
has led some to argue that it is simply the experience of  images, so that if  one is 
aware of  an image, one is ipso facto in a state of  eikasia. Dominick, ‘Images’, 2, cites 
this as a reason to treat eikasia ‘as something that one experiences rather than exer­
cises’. Similarly, we might think that the four conditions relate to the two powers 
(δυνάμεις) of  belief  and knowledge in Book 5 by being states of  these powers (e.g. 
N. Smith, ‘Plato on Knowledge as a Power’, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, 38 
(2000), 145–68 at 146 n. 3). But dianoia and noēsis are equally conditions, and 
Socrates describes these as ways of  reasoning about their objects. Even if  one 
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This is the basic textual evidence—and it is not much. All it allows 
us to say with certainty is that eikasia is set over images (εἰκόνες) 
and that these are likenesses of  the sensible originals that are the 
object of  pistis. What we say beyond this depends on how (if  at 
all) we think this minimal description is developed in the Cave 
allegory.
There are two main views. Some commentators believe that the 
Line’s distinction between eikasia and pistis is introduced in order 
to illustrate the relationship between dianoia and noēsis (which also 
involves an image–original relationship). If  that is right, eikasia is 
principally a way of  illustrating dianoia, and not a significant kind 
of  cognition in its own right.6 From here, it is a small step to claim 
that eikasia has no place in the Cave allegory. The allegory repre­
sents ‘the effect on our nature of  education and lack of  education’ 
(τὴν ἡμετέραν ϕύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας, 7, 514 a 1–2): if  
eikasia has little or no independent significance, it will hardly fea­
ture significantly in Plato’s account of  education. Other commen­
tators, however, believe that the Line represents four sui generis 
kinds of  cognition, each as literal as the other. After all, Socrates 
never says that eikasia or pistis have a special status—mere similes, 
expository tools, or the like—but simply calls them two kinds of  
belief  (7, 533 e 3–534 a 2). Thus, they believe that Plato’s account 
of  all four kinds of  cognition continues into the Cave allegory, 
where they feature as stages in the educational progression it rep­
resents. So understood, eikasia is represented by the first stage in 
claimed that ‘dianoia’ and ‘noēsis’ only name states that are the conclusions of  distinct 
ways of  reasoning (though this would be hard to defend: e.g. 7, 533 d 4–7), this 
would make them cognitive states, but not passive ones, and the comparison would 
still suggest that eikasia is a cognitive attitude towards images that results from a 
particular way of  thinking about them. See also G. Fine, ‘Knowledge and Belief  in 
Republic V–VII’ [‘Republic V–VII’], in ead., Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected 
Essays (Oxford, 2003), 85–116 at 102–3.
6 See H. Jackson, ‘On Plato’s Republic VI 509 d sqq.’, Journal of  Philology, 10 
(1881), 132–50; P. Shorey, ‘The Idea of  the Good in Plato’s Republic’, Studies in 
Classical Philology, 1 (1885), 188–239 at 229; A.  S.  Ferguson, ‘Plato’s Simile of  
Light. Part I’, Classical Quarterly, 15 (1921), 131–52 and ‘Simile’; R. Robinson, 
Plato’s Earlier Dialectic [Dialectic] (Ithaca, 1941), 207; D. Ross, Plato’s Theory of  
Ideas (Oxford, 1951), 77; J. E. Raven, ‘Sun, Divided Line, and Cave’ [‘Sun, Line, 
Cave’], Classical Quarterly, 3 (1953), 22–32 at 25–6; C. Strang, ‘Plato’s Analogy of  
the Cave’ [‘Cave’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 4 (1986), 19–34; and 
Dominick, ‘Images’. For a critical assessment of  this reading, see R. C. Cross and 
A. D. Woozely, Plato’s Republic: A Philosophical Commentary [Republic] (London, 
1964), 209–13.
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the Cave allegory: the condition of  the prisoners who mistake real­
ity for the play of  shadows on the cave wall.7
This disagreement separates the two principal schools of  
thought on eikasia. For those who deny that the Line and Cave are 
parallel—who deny ‘para llelism’—we learn most about eikasia by 
comparing it with dianoia. Since dianoia involves studying Forms 
through sensibles used as images, eikasia is understood to be study­
ing sensible originals through images like shadows or reflections. 
For example, Yancy Dominick concludes that:
[E]ikasia is the state in which one can view an image [of  a sensible] as an 
image—typically, it involves the attempt to learn about some object 
through consideration of  an image of  that object. This state, notably, does 
not usually involve any confusion of  image and original.8
Parallelism, in contrast, leads us to the opposite conclusion. The 
prisoners fail to view the shadows as images and do indeed confuse 
image and original. It would also be at least misleading to say that 
the prisoners represent an ‘attempt to learn’ about sensibles. Thus, 
the standard reading, taking its cue from the condition of  the pris­
oners, sees the essential feature of  eikasia as mistaking image for 
original. This is combined with a view about the scope of  the alle­
gory: that by ‘education and the lack of  education’, Socrates means 
the kind of  upbringing that either succeeds or fails to make one a 
good person—one’s ethical education, broadly construed.9 This 
being so, the shadows on the cave wall do not represent any and all 
images, but images of  the kind of  value properties relevant to one’s 
ethical education; thus, in Socrates’ only direct reference to what 
the they represent, he describes ‘shadows of  justice’ (αἱ τοῦ δικαίου 
σκιαί, 7, 517 d 8–9).10 In short, the allegory tells us that just as the 
7 This has been a popular reading since the turn of  the twentieth century. 
See J. P. Hardie, ‘Plato’s Early Theory of  Ideas’, Mind, 5 (1896), 167–85; R. L. 
Nettleship, Lectures on Plato’s Republic [Lectures] (London, 1897); and, most influ­
entially, J. Adam, The Republic of  Plato [Republic], vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1902).
8 Dominick, ‘Images’, 1.
9 Arguably, this is not a special subject of  education, but what education (παιδεία) 
means for Plato. See Rep. 4, 425 c 4–5; Leg. 1, 643 d 6–644 b 4; and J. Wilberding, 
‘Prisoners and Puppeteers in the Cave’ [‘Puppeteers’], Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 27 (2004), 117–39 at 133.
10 There is an indirect reference at Rep. 7, 520 c 3–6. This form of  parallelism has 
been influential since it was defended in the 1960s by J. Malcolm, ‘The Line and the 
Cave’, Phronesis, 7 (1962), 38–45, and shortly after by Cross and Woozley, Republic. 
Dominick challenges it, claiming that when he uses the phrase ‘shadows of  justice’, 
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prisoners mistake shadows for real things, ordinary people mistake, 
for example, what appears good or just for what is good or just.
I am going to side with the standard reading insofar as I agree—
and, for the purposes of  this paper, simply assume—that the con­
dition of  the prisoners in the Cave allegory represents eikasia and 
that this is a specifically ethical form of  eikasia. But I do not draw 
the same conclusions from the Cave allegory. In particular, I do not 
believe that eikasia is simply the error of  mistaking image and ori­
gin al. To be sure, this is an error the prisoners make, but I will 
argue that it is not the best way to capture all the features, or even 
the essential features, of  what is cognitively significant about their 
condition. A broader examination shows that eikasia is not merely 
a type of  error, but rather a rudimentary form of  cognition that we 
find (I argue) in many places in the Republic: the kind of appearance­
sensitive, reason­insensitive cognition that seems to be crucially 
involved in Plato’s explanation of  both the cognition of  the non­
rational parts of  the soul and ethical error.
2. The object of  eikasia
The question ‘What is eikasia?’ can be divided into the questions 
‘What is the object of  eikasia?’ and ‘What exactly is eikasia with 
respect to this object?’. Where possible, I will try to keep these 
questions separate, answering them in turn: the first in this sec­
tion, the second in the following section. Here, then, my task is to 
offer an account of  the ‘likenesses’ or ‘images’ (εἰκόνες) that are 
the object of  eikasia. Socrates says that ‘by images I mean, first, 
shadows, then reflections in bodies of  water and in all close­packed, 
‘Socrates is not here describing the prisoners’ contests, but rather the “evils of  
human life” .  .  . (517 d 5)’ (‘Images’, 6–7). But Socrates is describing both: the 
prisoner’s condition represents these evils of  human life. Dominick fails to appreci­
ate that the metaphor ‘shadows of  justice’ has one foot in the allegory (‘shadows . . .’) 
and the other in what it represents (‘. . . of  justice’), as is common in Book 7. For 
example, the philosopher who turns to ‘the evils of  human life’ is also said, in a clear 
reference to the cave, to be unaccustomed to the darkness around him (7, 517 d 6–7). 
The same mistake is behind Dominick’s claim that the prisoners ‘compete in 
identifying shadows not of  justice, but of  “people and other animals” ’: of  course 
the prisoners do not see literal shadows of  justice, whatever that would mean, but 
the shadows of  people and animals that they do see are themselves metaphors that 
stand in need of  interpretation, and the claim is that they represent ethical images, 
including those described (in a new metaphor) as ‘shadows of  justice’.
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smooth, and shiny materials, and everything of  that kind, if  you 
understand’ (6, 509 d 10–510 a 3). He goes on to tell us that or di n ary 
sensibles—for example, ‘the animals around us, every plant, and 
the whole class of  manufactured things’ (510 a 5–6, Greek text 
above)—are that of  which they are images: ordinary sens ibles are 
‘that which it [sc. an image] is like’ (ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, a 5), and 
images and originals are related as ‘likeness to that which it is like’ 
(τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη, a 10). So far, so clear: sensible 
‘images’ are likenesses of  ordinary sensibles (where ‘ordinary’ 
simply means sensibles that are not themselves images).
However, commentators have found it difficult to avoid intro­
ducing a further sense of  ‘image’. Specifically, they have found it 
difficult to accommodate the kind of  ‘shadows of  justice’ that seem 
to be the object of  ethical eikasia without making the second of  the 
two central claims of  the standard reading, which by itself  I’ll label 
the ‘second­hand belief  reading’: that the ‘images’ relevant to eth ic al 
eikasia are popular or influential ethical views that are taken over 
unreflectively. This has been the most popular view for over a cen­
tury, a position helped by the fact that it has never received any 
direct critical assessment. But when so assessed, we find quite 
de cisive reasons to reject it.
2.1. The second-hand belief  reading
In one of  the earliest and most influential accounts of  eikasia, 
James Adam distinguished between two kinds of  images: visible 
images and ‘opinable’ images.11 The former are visible copies 
like  shadows and reflections, and eikasia with respect to them 
would be, for example, mistaking a shadow of  a man for the 
man himself. But these images, Adam thought, could not explain 
ethical errors. Thus, he introduced the second kind, opinable 
images, which includes what we grasp with our mind as well as 
what we grasp with our eyes. Among these images are ‘popular 
canons or opinions’ about what is good or just that are embodied 
in  the works of  culturally influential figures like sophists, poets, 
or  politicians. Someone who suffers ethical eikasia, then, is 
 someone  who uncritically accepts these popular opinions and, 
11 Which Adam (Republic, 72, 157–8) calls ὁραταὶ εἰκόνες and δοξασταὶ εἰκόνες.
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thus, fails to see that they are mere ‘shadows’ of  what really is good 
or just. Many commentators since Adam have defended views 
along these lines, taking  ethical eikasia to be the acquisition of  
beliefs that are in some sense ‘second­hand’, derived either directly 
from other people’s beliefs or from ethical views embodied in more 
abstract cultural or political forces, like poems or laws.12 This read­
ing is seen as a solution to the putative problem posed by the move 
from sensory to evaluative images: from literal shadows to meta­
phorical ‘shadows of  justice’. On the one hand, it is thought that 
evaluative images cannot be sensory, on the grounds that we 
don’t literally see value properties like goodness or justice. On the 
12 The following is by no means exhaustive, but it gives a sense of  the range of  
readings that fall under this umbrella. Nettleship: ‘[when Plato speaks of] shadows 
and reflexions which are taken for realities we must think how many views there are 
which circulate in society and form a large part of  what we call our knowledge, but 
which when we examine them are seen to be distorted, imperfect representations of  
fact, coming to us often through the media of  several other men’s minds, and the 
media of  our own fancies and prejudices’ (Lectures, 242–5). N. R. Murphy: visual 
eikasia illustrates how ordinary people ‘owing to the vicious cycle in current educa­
tion . . . receive their own opinions back again . . . as if  reflected in a mirror’ (‘The 
“Simile of  Light” in Plato’s Republic’, Classical Quarterly, 26 (1932), 93–102 at 
101). Raven: while eikasia in the Line concerns strictly visual images, the correspond­
ing imagery in the Cave presents ‘a more comprehensive picture of  second­hand 
impressions and opinions’ (‘Sun, Line, Cave’, 27–8). Cross and Woozley: ‘second­
hand opinions purveyed by the rhetorician and politician, who put shadows or 
 semblances between men’s minds and the facts’ (Republic, 220–1). J. Malcolm: the 
‘images’ that the shadows represent are false ethical beliefs that are copies of  true 
ethical beliefs (the objects of  pistis) (‘The Cave Revisited’ [‘Cave’], Classical 
Quarterly, 31 (1981), 60–8 at 61 and 68). J. Annas: ‘for Plato relying on experience 
covers more than just assuming in an unthinking way that the things we see, like 
trees, are what is real. It also covers taking over beliefs, some of  them important like 
our beliefs about justice, which are second­hand, picked up from society in the way 
the prisoners see the shadow­pictures on the wall of the Cave’ (‘Plato, Republic V–VII’ 
[‘Rep. V–VII’], Royal Institute of  Philosophy Lecture Series, 20 (1986), 3–18 at 15; 
see also ‘Understanding and the Good: Sun, Line, and Cave’, in R. Kraut (ed.), 
Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays (Lanham, Md, 1997), 143–68 at 155). T. H. Irwin: 
ethical eikasia occurs when we ‘accept, without question or criticism, the views we 
have been brought up with or have absorbed from our social environment’ (Plato’s 
Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 276; cf. Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), 221). Fine: 
‘Plato speaks about contending “about the shadows of justice”—about, that is, ordinary, 
unreflective beliefs about justice’ (‘Republic V–VII’, 103). N. Pappas: ‘the prisoners 
who squint at and squabble over shadows represent all those citizens who believe 
what politicians and artists tell them’ (Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and 
the Republic [Republic], 2nd ed. (London, 2003), 110). Wilberding: the conjectures 
of  sophists, poets, and politicians about what the many believe (the latter beliefs 
being pistis) (‘Puppeteers’, 129–32). M. Schofield: ‘the shadow in their minds left 
by the culture in which they have been raised’ (‘Metaspeleology’, in D. Scott (ed.), 
Maieusis: Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of  Myles Burnyeat (Oxford, 
2007), 216–31 at 225).
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other hand, Plato says elsewhere that people typically do unreflec­
tively accept the prevailing opinion of  what is good or just. The 
proposed solution, then, is to broaden our understanding of  ‘image’ 
to include this latter pheno menon. Difficulties begin, however, as 
soon as we compare second­hand opinions with Plato’s actual 
examples of  images: shadows, reflections, ‘and everything of  that 
kind’ (καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, 6, 510 a 3). Some commentators claim 
that shadows and reflections are just metaphors for the real objects 
of  eikasia.13 But this is difficult to reconcile with the text. The Line 
itself  is an analogy, but the four states it illustrates, and Socrates’ 
description of  them, are literal. This is obviously true of  noēsis, 
dianoia, and pistis, and it is unlikely that Socrates silently switches 
to symbolism only when he describes eikasia. For one thing, doing 
so would lead to highly convoluted imagery, with the lowest section 
of  the Line representing (as Socrates tells us)  shadows and reflec­
tions that in turn represent (as he fails to tells us) the real object of  
eikasia—a real object never explicitly identified in the dialogue. 
Notice also that Socrates defines the proposed metaphors, shadows 
and reflections, by their relationship to the entirely literal object of  
pistis, sensible originals. Finally and crucially: what is the meta­
phor? At least in a philosophical context, to warrant being called a 
‘metaphor’, there should be some demonstrable analogical similar­
ity between taking images for originals and unreflectively accept­
ing popular opinions. As far as I’m aware, no one has spelt out how 
the metaphor is supposed to work, and no obvious answer suggests 
itself.14
13 See Wilberding, ‘Puppeteers’, 131–2; Pappas, Republic, 110; V. Karasmanis, 
‘Plato’s Republic: The Line and the Cave’, Apeiron, 21 (1988), 147–71 at 159–60; 
and Morrison, ‘Difficulties’, 222; C. P. Sze, ‘Eikasia and pistis in Plato’s Allegory of  
the Cave’, Classical Quarterly, 27 (1977), 127–38; and Nettleship, Lectures, 242–5.
14 On one side, a person bases (a) their belief  on (b) a shadow or reflection that is 
a likeness of  (c) some original. On the other, a person bases (1) their belief  on (2) 
another influential belief. One suggestion is (a) : (b) :: (1) : (2). Perhaps the idea is 
that both beliefs are based on something ‘shadowy’ in the sense of  unclear or less 
than true. But this drops the essential likeness relationship between (b) and (c). 
Alternatively, perhaps (b), the shadows, are analogous to (1), the unreflective beliefs, 
so: (b) : (c) :: (1) : (2). The idea might be: as shadows are passive copies of  what casts 
them, ordinary ethical beliefs are passive copies of  others’ beliefs. But images are 
supposed to fall short of  their original, and these two beliefs seem equally in ad­
equate. Moreover, if  the shadows and reflections of  the Line represent the beliefs of  
eikasia, do the statues of  animals and plants represent the beliefs of  pistis? Or in the 
Cave, are the prisoners’ beliefs represented not by their beliefs but by the shadows 
themselves?
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The second­hand belief  reading must, then, find a place for 
popu lar ethical opinions within the scope of  ‘every thing of  that 
kind’, alongside shadows and reflections. To do so, these opinions 
need to meet two criteria. First, (a) they must actually be images 
(εἰκόνες) in some relevant sense. The word εἰκών, a cognate of  
ἐοικέναι, ‘to be like’, refers to something that is an image or likeness 
of  something else, and in this context we know that it refers to 
images of  the object of  pistis, ordinary sensibles. A shadow of  a 
man is like a man, but not a man; an image of  an F thing (a sensible 
original) is something that is like an F thing, but not really F. The 
relevant sense of  ‘likeness’ here is not faithful resemblance but per­
suasive verisimilitude: it seems or appears F, without actually 
being so.15 Second, (b) they must, as images, play the right kind of  
explanatory role in eikasia. That is, their nature as images must 
explain why a person at the level of  eikasia acquires the beliefs that 
they acquire. This should include explaining the prisoners’ basic 
error: believing that an image of  an F thing is an F thing because, 
first, it appears to be an F thing and, second, they fail to recognize 
that it merely appears so. These criteria do little more than demand 
of  any account of  images that it describe something that is recog­
nizably the same thing that Plato describes when he talks about 
images in Books 6 and 7.
The second­hand belief  reading struggles with both criteria. 
With respect to criterion (a), how can popular beliefs (or prevalent 
cultural norms, folk wisdoms, or the like) themselves be images in 
the relevant sense? For example, if  we believe that all pleasure is 
good, the idea would need to be not that all pleasure seems good, 
but that our belief itself  is a likeness in some relevant sense. After 
all, if  it is pleasure that seems good to me, what others believe 
about it is in this respect irrelevant: pleasure’s appearance would 
give me a reason to believe it is good whether or not the poets tell 
me so—it even gives me a reason to disbelieve them if  they claimed 
the opposite.16 In fact, few defenders of  the second­hand belief  
15 See e.g. the context of  Socrates’ reference to ‘shadows of  justice’ at 7, 517 d 
8–9, where it is clear that he means what appears just but does not in fact have any 
substantial resemblance to real justice.
16 There have been some attempts to make beliefs bona fide images. Malcolm, 
‘Cave’, argues that the images are false beliefs that are copies of  true beliefs with 
‘distortions and misrepresentations’, though even he admits that ‘it is not obvious 
in what sense falsities are ‘ “copies” of  truths’ (68). N. Smith, ‘How the Prisoners in 
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reading make a serious attempt to meet criterion (a). A little reflec­
tion makes it clear why: images are theoretically important only if  
the fact that they are images is playing an explanatory role. In fact, 
despite their prominence in Plato’s own account, the second­hand 
belief  reading makes no theoretical use of  images at all.
Instead, it has its own independent account of  why people adopt 
their ethical beliefs. The central claim of  the second­hand belief  
reading is that ethical eikasia is an uncritical acceptance of  the 
dominant ethical beliefs in one’s society, beliefs that gain apparent 
credibility by being enshrined in laws, eulogized in poems, taught 
by supposedly wise sophists, or simply widely believed. The error 
is to trust implicitly the testimony of  these apparent authorities, 
rather than examine their claims for oneself. This is the sense in 
which a person’s belief  is ‘second­hand’: they adopt it as their 
belief  because it is a certain other’s belief. Thus, insofar as a belief  
is genuinely second­hand, it is acquired not because of  the content 
of  the ‘copied’ belief, but because of  the trust placed in the other 
believer. Whether the belief  is ‘ϕ­ing is just’ or ‘ϕ­ing is unjust’, 
the person’s reason for believing it will be the same: that it is, for 
example, what the poets say. So even if popular ethical beliefs were 
images of  the right kind, somehow likenesses of  the object of  pis-
tis, for the second­hand belief  reading this would still not be why 
ordinary people uncritically accept them. Thus, against criterion 
(b), this reading suggests that there is no theoretical connection 
between images and eikasia.
We find, then, that the second­hand belief  reading presents 
something that has very little relation (metaphorical or otherwise) 
to what Plato describes: it introduces both a new sense of  ‘image’ 
and a new error for these images to cause, neither of  which are 
present in the text. So what reason do people have to think that it is 
what Plato is talking about? I believe much of  the explanation is 
the conviction (perhaps implicit) that value properties are just not 
the sort of  things to be seen and, therefore, that we are forced to 
introduce something different from the sensory images that we find 
in the text. Consider, for example, Julia Annas’s complaint that:
Plato’s Cave are “Like Us” ’, Proceedings of  the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient 
Philosophy, 13 (1997), 187–204, argues that the images are false accounts, like the 
definitions of  justice found in Book 1, which approximate true definitions.
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In these passages too much has got lumped together on the side of  experi­
ence. Relying on the senses is taken to involve a passive and uncritical 
attitude, and accepting the reality of  what the senses report is run together 
with accepting second­hand opinions about values. Plato is so eager to 
downgrade the senses because he has not bothered to analyse very care­
fully what ‘the senses’ covers.17
It is interesting that, despite attributing this view to Plato, Annas 
criticizes it for much the same reason that I do: second­hand beliefs 
do not have enough in common with the sensory images that Plato 
describes. Yet she still finds this interpretation unavoidable, pre­
sumably because she finds it difficult to imagine what evaluative 
images might be, if  not second­hand beliefs. What I hope to show 
in the next few pages is that it is we, not Plato, who need ‘to analyse 
very carefully what “the senses” covers’. If  we are to reconcile the 
Republic’s appeals to evaluative and sensory images, we need to ask: 
how narrow or broad are the contents of  perception for Plato and, 
in particular, do they extend to value properties? Many commenta­
tors have simply assumed the answer is no. I will argue that the 
answer is yes.
2.2. Evaluative images are sensory
I will argue that the evaluative images that are the object of  ethical 
eikasia are the same in kind as the shadows or reflections that are 
the object of  perceptual eikasia. In other words, ethical eikasia is 
just a subset of  perceptual eikasia, and there is no need to posit an 
additional non­perceptual kind of  eikasia.18
17 J. Annas, ‘Rep. V–VII’, 16; see also ‘Good’, 155.
18 This should be distinguished from the claim that all perceptual experience is 
eikasia. Paton, ‘Eikasia’, argues that eikasia is perceptual experience as such (includ­
ing imagination, memory, dreams, etc.), before its content has been affirmed or 
denied. Moss, ‘Assent’, defends a similar view. Consider Plato’s claim that percep­
tion is sufficient by itself  to tell us what a finger is, without any help from under­
standing (7, 523 a 1–525 a 14, discussed further below). For Paton, since this is just 
perception—without reflection or active affirmation—it is eikasia. On my account, 
since it allows us to grasp an ordinary sensible—to grasp what a finger is—it is pistis. 
The accuracy of  the perception matters: perception can adequately grasp some 
properties, like ‘being a finger’, but not others, like ‘being just’, so only perceptual 
experiences of  the latter properties—insofar as they are misleading and, thus, 
 prevent us from grasping a sensible original—are the object of  eikasia. As H. W. B. 
Joseph, Knowledge and the Good in Plato’s Republic (London, 1948), 40, said in 
response to Paton: ‘it is surely strange that when Plato named as objects of  
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I think most people would agree that if other things were equal, 
we should treat all the examples of  images in Books 6 and 7 as 
equally sensory. After all, images are sensory in Plato’s explicit 
descriptions of  them, and he never invites us to modify this descrip­
tion: instead, he moves seamlessly from images like  shadows and 
reflections to images like ‘shadows of  justice’, as if  they are all, qua 
images, the same. But many commentators believe that other 
things are unequal, because they believe that the idea of  sens ible 
images of  goodness or justice is intrinsically problematic and, thus, 
an idea from which Plato must be rescued. The usual rescue strat­
egy is, as we saw, to interpolate a change in the meaning of  ‘image’. 
So understood, this reading is motivated almost entirely by a puta­
tive need for interpretive charity.
The problem is that, implicitly, this takes a dogmatic stance in a 
debate about the contents of  perception, effectively failing to 
appreciate that it is a debate with two sides. On one side, it is some­
times argued that perception only has ‘low level’ content: simple 
and uncontroversially perceptible properties like colours, shapes, 
smells, or tones. From this perspective, the idea of  sensory evalu­
ative appearances is almost a category error. An alphabet of  colours 
and smells could never spell something like ‘good’ or ‘just’—after 
all, goodness and justice don’t have a colour or smell. But on the 
other side, there are those who argue that perception can also have 
‘high level’ content. A proponent of  this view will believe, for 
example, that I can see the books on my shelf, and see them as 
books, even though ‘being a book’ is not a property that is re du­
cible to colours and shapes. Similarly, they might believe that I can 
see that the books are on the shelf; that three lie horizontally; or 
that some are damaged. Arguably, this is closer to a commonsense 
view of  perception, since it fits both ordinary language (we say 
‘I see books’ not ‘I see a mosaic of  colours and shapes and infer 
there are books’) and our experience (try looking at a bookshelf  
eikasia  the shadows and reflections of  things, he meant to include the sensible 
appearances of  things as we perceive them and not their shadows and reflections.’ 
One source of  the problem is an argument (10, 598 a 1–b 8) that is sometimes 
thought to imply that veridical perceptual experiences are included in the appear­
ances that Plato is concerned with in Book 10 (see Paton, 85–6; Moss, 223–4); 
I think a closer reading of  the passage shows that the argument’s conclusion is that 
even in many ordinary perceptions there are properties that are not veridically 
 represented.
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and seeing shapes and colours rather than coloured books). Within 
such a theory, there is space for disagreement about exactly which 
properties can be represented in perception—can we see that some­
thing is fragile, dangerous, hot, disgusting, tasty, angry, or good?—
but there is nothing in principle against including value properties.19
I will argue that Plato holds this second view of  perception and 
includes value properties among its contents. Indeed, we already 
have one argument in favour of  this: now that we have shown that 
the putative need for interpretive charity was misguided, the ‘prob­
lem’ that we started with—that Plato seems to treat evaluative 
images as another type of  sensory image—becomes instead a prima 
facie reason to think that his view of  perception includes value 
properties among its content. On investigation, the Republic gives 
us plenty of  reasons to think this is right.
In the Republic, Plato says most about perception in the so­called 
‘finger’ passage, where Socrates describes the different faculties the 
soul must use to understand different types of  properties (7, 523 a 
1–525 a 14). We learn that ‘the judgements of  perception are them­
selves sufficient’ (ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, 523 b 1–2) to 
tell us what a finger is, and it presents information, albeit less fully 
or reliably, about relational properties like thickness, lightness, and 
smallness. By ‘sufficient’, Plato means that the soul can use percep­
tion to grasp the property without help from another cognitive 
ability: ‘an ordinary soul isn’t compelled to ask the understanding 
what a finger is, since sight doesn’t indicate to it that a finger is at 
the same time the opposite of  a finger’ (οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν 
ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις 
19 For a modern discussion of  these two positions, and a defence of  the latter, see 
S.  Siegel, The Contents of  Visual Experience (Oxford, 2010). Among those who 
explicitly include value properties in perception’s high­level content, Plato would 
be a less controversial example. The view I attribute to him is that we can have a 
perceptual experience of  something as good or as just where this requires no direct 
or even reliable link between a perceiver and actual instantiations of  goodness or 
justice. This can be contrasted with those who appeal to ‘moral perception’ as a way 
to ground a realist moral epistemology (e.g. R. Audi, ‘Moral Perception Defended’, 
Argumenta, 1 (2015), 5–28). Such a view requires the possibility that we veridically 
perceive moral properties and do so in a way that is not grounded in, for example, 
prior moral judgements. It is hard to imagine anyone who could disagree with this 
view more than Plato. He believes that moral knowledge requires intelligible Forms 
of  moral properties precisely because perception is insufficient. He is interested in 
the misrepresentation of  value properties by perception, since this helps him to 
explain why perception fails to ground a realist moral epistemology.
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αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνεν τὸν δάκτυλον τοὐναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι, 523 d 
3–6). Thus, perception has a significant share of  the work of  repre­
senting the world and it represents high­level properties, like 
‘being a finger’. Consonantly, in the same passage, perception is 
described as an interpretive faculty that is not limited to the role of  
passively recording what strikes the senses, but actively presents us 
with representations of  the world: it ‘gives reports to the soul’ 
(παραγγέλλειν τῇ ψυχῇ, 524 a 2–3), ‘says’ (λέγει) something to us 
(524 a 7), and offers ‘interpretations’ (ἑρμηνεῖαι, 524 b 1). There is 
more than one way to flesh out this view of  perception, but this is 
enough to show that it is a view that is highly amenable to the pos­
sibility of  higher­level perceptual content.
Further evidence that this high­level content includes value 
properties comes from the role that images play in Plato’s tripartite 
psychology.20 Consider the following argument:
 1. The cognitive resources available to the non­rational parts of  
the soul are sensory.
 2. The non­rational parts are able to cognize evaluative images.
Therefore:
 3. Evaluative images are sensory.
The two premises here are substantial claims, but they are not 
especially controversial. Both have been discussed and defended at 
length elsewhere, and I will not add to their defence here.21 But in 
order to make clear the motivation behind them, it will be useful to 
outline briefly Book 10’s move from sensory to evaluative images, 
which is a striking parallel of  the move from sensory to evaluative 
images in Books 6 and 7.22
20 We might also consider the discussion of  belief  in Book 5, where the ‘sight 
lovers’ (ϕιλοθεάμονες) have beliefs about the sights of  not only beauty, but even justice 
(479 a 3–5 and d 10–e 4). This is certainly suggestive, although the passage does not 
make it easy to pin down exactly how the lovers of  sights get from sensible instances 
(or putative instances) of  beauty and justice to their beliefs about beauty and 
 justice.
21 See e.g. H. Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle 
[Brute] (Oxford, 2006), and J. Moss, ‘Appearances and Calculation: Plato’s Division 
of  the Soul’ [‘Calculation’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2008), 35–68. 
Note, however, that neither Lorenz nor Moss endorse (explicitly, at least) my 
conclusion (3).
22 The images discussed in Book 10 are the same as those that are the object of  
eikasia. Both are introduced as—very nearly defined as—sensory copies of  ordinary 
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The first step is an argument that appeals to optical illusions to 
show that sensory images ‘exert their power’ on the non­rational 
parts of  the soul (10, 602 c 4–603 a 8). It does so by arguing that 
even after our rational part has used reason to conclude that an 
optical illusion is false, there is still a non­rational part of  us that 
continues to believe it. While the mechanics of  the argument are 
tricky, it gives a clear picture of  what the non­rational parts can 
and cannot do.23 They are aware of  sensory images and can form a 
belief24 that assents to them. But they don’t have access to higher, 
non­sensory cognitive abilities: they cannot themselves use reason 
to figure out that an image is illusory (they are alogiston: non­rational 
or unreasoning) and they cannot correct their error in response to 
the conclusions reached by the rational part.
Plato then moves from these sensory images to evaluative images. 
The example of  optical illusions is introduced simply to illustrate 
how the non­rational parts will be affected by the real object of  
Plato’s concern: the ‘images of  virtue’ (εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς; 10, 600 e 5) 
that imitative poetry produces. He gives the example of  a non­
rational part’s inability to question, and thus automatic acceptance 
of, misleading theatrical appearances of  how one ought to grieve. 
In short, the story seems to be that the non­rational parts’ sensory 
sensibles, with reflections being illustrative examples in both cases. Many commen­
tators over the years have made the connection between the Line and Cave and 
Book 10; recent examples are Moss, ‘Assent’, and Dominick, ‘Images’ (Dominick 
cites Book 10 as evidence against the idea that eikasia typically involves error, 
though he focuses exclusively on paintings and reflections, and does not discuss the 
images of  imitative poetry that certainly are error­inducing, albeit in a complex 
psychological way: see Section 3.3 below). S. Halliwell, The Aesthetics of  Mimesis 
(Princeton, 2002), 57–8, denies there is a connection, citing, first, the fact that paint­
ings lack a one­to­one relationship with their originals (unlike reflections and 
 shadows)—though he does not explain why this is significant—and, second, a lack 
of  shared vocabulary between the two passages. Yet the images of  both passages are 
variously described as semblances (ϕαντάσματα), images (εἴδωλα), and even imita­
tions (sensible originals are ‘that which was imitated’, τοῖς μιμηθεῖσιν, by images, 6, 
510 b 4). And although the most common word for images in Books 6 and 7, εἰκόνες, 
is not used in Book 10, it had already been used to describe imitations in Book 3 (e.g. 
401 b 2). Plato generally eschews the use of  technical vocabulary, and various words 
can, as here, be used to describe the same thing. See also C. Belfiore, ‘A Theory of  
Imitation in Plato’s Republic’, Transactions of  the American Philological Association, 
144 (1984), 121–46 at 129 n. 26.
23 For a full reading of  the argument, see my ‘Appearance, Perception, and Non­
rational Belief: Republic 602 c–603 a’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 47 
(2014), 81–118.
24 The non­rational part of  the soul believes (δοξάζει) something (10, 602 e 8–603 
a 2) and the two parts form opposite beliefs (δόξαι, 603 d 1–2).
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but non­rational access to the world explains their recalcitrant 
acceptance of  sensory images, whether these are optical illusions or 
evaluative images.25 This, then, is the second time in the Republic 
that Plato shifts from sensory to evaluative images without com­
ment, as if  there is no significant difference in kind between them. 
But this time we have two further reasons to think that there is 
indeed no significant difference. One is that the shift occurs within 
an explicit argument that would be invalidated by a change in the 
meaning of  ‘images’.26 The second is that this passage invites a ver­
sion of  the aforementioned argument: it argues that the non­
rational parts are both (1) unable to reason yet able to grasp sensory 
information and (2) able to grasp evaluative images, which entails 
that (3) these evaluative images are sensory.
I conclude that in the Republic Plato recognizes, and makes sig­
nificant theoretical use of, sensory evaluative images. Nonetheless, 
we might still wonder what exactly they are for Plato. For a range 
of  simple value properties, like goodness or pleasure, the idea is 
simple, assuming we accept the tenability of  high­level perceptible 
properties: just as a column of  a certain sort can look like—i.e. be 
represented in perception as—a doric column, armour of  a certain 
sort can look like fine armour. And if  the armour merely appears 
fine—perhaps it is impressively ornate, but poorly constructed—
then it is a fitting example of  the kind of  misleading evaluative 
images that are the object of  eikasia.27 It is more challenging to 
understand how Plato thinks perception represents the thick value 
properties that are mentioned in the Republic’s two key discussions 
of  images: ‘shadows of  justice’, ‘images of  virtue’. One clue is that 
in Book 10 the normative force of  ‘images of  virtue’ comes from 
how they represent behaviour as pleasant or painful.28 A plausible 
25 For a detailed defence of  this reading, see Moss, ‘Calculation’.
26 A number of  key conclusions about sensory images are required in his account 
of  evaluative images: that they are ‘third in relation to the truth’ (10, 595 c 8–597 e 
10); that they are epistemically inferior (598 a 1–602 c 3); and that they affect the 
non­rational part of  the soul (602 c 4–603 a 8).
27 See J. Moss ‘What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?’, in G. R. F. Ferrari 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (Cambridge, 2007), 415–44 for 
more discussion of  the properties that might make something appear e.g. fine or 
excellent.
28 Pleasure and pain constantly attend imitative poetry’s images of  people and 
their actions (10, 603 c 5–9), and Socrates’ example of  poetic images—apparently 
praiseworthy responses to grief—clearly compels its audience by the way various 
behaviour is represented as pleasant or painful.
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proposal, then, is that for Plato representations of  more complex 
value properties are grounded in representations of  pleasure or 
pain, perhaps in a way that is, in turn, grounded in memories of  
and associations between previous perceptual experiences (the 
kind of  empirical cognitive activity I will associate with eikasia in 
Section 3.2). According to this view, ‘images of  virtue’ will be 
pleasure­ and pain­tinted images of  how one ought to behave or of  
what sort of  person one ought to be. Since this does not require a 
direct grasp of  concepts like ‘justice’ or ‘courage’, it is easier to see 
how they are accessible to the non­rational parts of  the soul (which 
are the primary target of  poetry’s ‘images of  virtue’). At the same 
time, someone familiar with the relevant concepts could identify 
such an image of  how we ought to behave as just behaviour, and in 
that sense perceive the behaviour as just.
2.3. Eikasia as an explanation of  ethical error
Now that a view of  eikasia is beginning to emerge, I want to take a 
step back and make some general observations about the role eika-
sia plays in the Republic. It is important to recognize that eikasia is 
introduced as a fundamental part of  images that illustrate Plato’s 
basic epistemology and metaphysics and his account of  the effect 
of  education. Given this setting, we should expect eikasia to 
describe a fact about the human condition that is intimately related 
to Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics. We should also expect it 
to be something important: the elaborate imagery of  the Cave alle­
gory is designed primarily to represent the prisoners’ strange life 
and the surprising fact that they are, with respect to education, 
‘like us’. With this in mind, the second­hand belief  reading again 
looks out of  place: that most people are content with second­hand 
ethical opinions is a fairly unremarkable psychological or socio­
logical fact, with no particular relevance to Plato’s epistemology 
and metaphysics, and it does not seem to warrant the dismal 
appraisal implied by comparing us to the cave dwellers.
My proposal is that Plato is offering a general account of  ethical 
error based on a view about value properties. Plato believes that 
evaluative facts are especially difficult to grasp accurately. This is a 
fundamental premise of  the Republic’s project, since ordinary 
 people’s failure to understand goodness or justice is what explains 
the need for philosophy and philosopher rulers. The point is not 
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simply that ethical knowledge requires grasping Forms, but that 
know ledge, rather than true belief, is necessary in ethics to a much 
greater extent than it is elsewhere. With respect to most properties, 
we have the less error­prone pistis (see Section 3.1), and even in 
other practical areas there doesn’t seem to be the same need for 
knowledge: a farmer or carpenter, for example, can do just fine 
with a useful set of  true beliefs. In contrast, people’s beliefs about 
goodness or justice are often greatly mistaken and Plato is, conse­
quently, pessimistic about our ability to live happy and virtuous 
lives: truly living well requires achieving, or being ruled by those 
who have already achieved, a formidable philosophical education 
that is well beyond most people’s reach and confined to a very 
 specific political setting. Plato goes so far as to say that ‘there can 
be no happiness, either public or private, in any other city [than 
one ruled by philosophers]’ (χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλῃ τις 
εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ, 5, 473 e 3–4). Even allowing 
for hyperbole, this calls for explanation.
My point, in short, is that we will not find this explanation if  we 
look only at the upper regions of  Plato’s metaphysics and epis tem­
ol ogy, such as the austere requirements on the acquisition of  
knowledge. The essential other half  of  the explanation is his 
account of  the sensible world, the two kinds of  belief  it produces, 
and why everyday ethical beliefs are of  the lower kind, eikasia. By 
explaining why eikasia is not an adequate practical guide, Plato 
thereby justifies his pessimistic assessment of  ordinary people’s 
state of  ethical education. Note that this pessimism is not about 
ordinary people per se, but about the world that ordinary people 
live in: the problem is not widespread foolishness, but the ob scur­
ity of  evaluative facts. When it comes to value properties like good­
ness or justice, we don’t have easy access to self­explanatory 
sensible examples and, thus, most of  us rely on images or like­
nesses of  goodness or justice.29 Unfortunately, mere images of  
goodness or justice are usually false or misleading, so in the absence 
of  knowledge, or a knowledgeable guide, we are likely to acquire 
false beliefs. Rather than the prisoners themselves—who are, after 
29 The implication is that not all properties are equal: e.g. we can identify large 
and small things accurately, yet not just and unjust things. See Polit. 285 d 9–286 a 
4 and Phaedr. 250 b 1–5, which both N.  Cooper, ‘The Importance of  διάνοια in 
Plato’s Theory of  Forms’, Classical Quarterly, 16 (1966), 65–9, and Strang, ‘Cave’, 
23–4, discuss in this context.
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all, prisoners, compelled to face the shadows because their legs and 
necks are manacled (7, 514 a 5–b 1)—we should blame their 
im prisoned condition: the cave and the shadow­show that is the 
world they are compelled to live in, which represents the sensible 
world that we live in. The condition of  the prisoners represents 
Plato’s belief  that when it comes to questions of  value, we live in an 
inherently misleading world: what appears good or just is often not 
so, and what is good or just often doesn’t appear so. That this mis­
alignment of  appearance and reality is an unalterable feature of  the 
world is illustrated by the fact that the cave itself  is not something 
that even philosopher rulers can change or truly escape, just as we 
cannot get rid of  the sensible world and the faults inherent in it. 
Those who are made to return to the cave with knowledge of  the 
outside world do not dismantle the shadow­show or lead the pris­
oners outside; the best they can do is recognize the shadows for 
what they are (520 c 1–5) and educate and rule the prisoners 
accordingly.30
3. Eikastic cognition
The forgoing highlights the importance of  understanding how 
eikasia is represented by the condition of  the prisoners in the Cave 
allegory. Examining the prisoners’ condition will allow me to 
address the second of  the two basic questions about eikasia: I have 
so far concluded that eikasia’s object is sensory images, but what 
exactly is eikasia with respect to this object? I will begin by exam­
ining the prisoners’ error of  confusing shadows for real things, 
which is commonly identified with eikasia. I will argue that this 
identification is a mistake and that it has prevented commentators 
from noticing the more successful, if  still rudimentary, features of  
the prisoners’ thinking that allow them to function despite being 
confined to a stream of  shadows.
30 By blaming the limitations of  the sensible world, not ordinary people, I am not 
suggesting that human nature has no role. It seems likely, for example, that mislead­
ing appearances are, for Plato, tied to how human motivation works, and in particu­
lar how we represent something as pleasant or painful. My claim is just that the 
conditions that explain eikasia’s prevalence are not a fault of  a person or group of  
people, but a result of  inescapable features of  the human condition.
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3.1. The basic error
Drawing on the Cave, it is common to identify eikasia with the 
error of  mistaking an image for that of  which it is an image, like 
mistaking a shadow for what casts it. Though I will argue that it is 
wrong to identify eikasia with this error, as if  the word just labels a 
type of  fallacy, I think it is indeed true that it is a kind of  cognition 
in which something related to this error is fundamental. But a 
number of  clarifications are necessary.
First, some formulations of  the error associated with eikasia 
have a slight but significant difference. Gail Fine, for example, 
defines eikasia as a failure to ‘systematically discriminate between 
images and their objects’.31 Notice that this formulation remains 
neutral about whether eikasia is an encounter with images or with 
originals. This is because Fine believes that experiencing an image 
is not only insufficient (which I think is right) but also unnecessary 
for eikasia. As I understand it, her point is that if  you have only 
experienced apparent justice, you will fail to recognize a genuinely 
just act when you see it; thus, you can have eikasia even while 
ex peri en cing the original of  something, not just its image. But in 
this example, is the relevant object of  eikasia really the just act? 
The idea is that the person fails to recognize the action as a just 
action, so it will not appear like something just to them, but some­
thing, for example, unjust or foolish. Thus, since it is the appear­
ance that matters in eikasia, the object of  cognition is still an image, 
such as a mere image of  injustice or foolishness.
The second clarification is subtle but important. The prisoners 
are introduced to explain the ethical mindset of  ordinary people. 
This being so, they do not represent ethical eikasia, exactly, but 
ordinary people’s ethical eikasia, and this leaves open the possibil­
ity that there could be unordinary kinds of  eikasia. In particular, 
while the prisoners’ ignorance represents something typical of  
eikasia, it is not obvious that it is essential. Consider the following 
(unlikely) possibility. Imagine I recognize ethical images as images, 
but have no experience of  or information about their originals. 
I might (mistakenly) think: ‘Though these are just images, they’re 
probably pretty close to reality, and they’re all I have to go on, so 
31 Fine, ‘Republic V–VII’, 102. A similar definition is given by Wilberding, 
‘Puppeteers’, 129.
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I’m going to base my beliefs on them.’ Following this line of think­
ing, I would acquire all the same ethical beliefs as any ordinary per­
son and do so for the same reason: I’ve based my beliefs on mere images. 
Is this still eikasia? How one answers depends on what one takes to be 
essential to eikasia: mistaking image for original or the cognitive con­
dition that results from this mistake, namely, a condition in which a 
person derives their judgements entirely from sensible images, 
taken largely at face value. Since the Line primarily concerns kinds 
of  cognition, not kinds of  error, I take the latter to be what eikasia 
names, and the former to be its typical cause. So understood, eika-
sia is defined by what one in fact derives one’s beliefs from—sensible 
images, rather than sensible originals or Forms—not what has led 
one to do so.32 Note that even though, strictly speaking, this entails 
that the standard view of  eikasia as mistaking image and original is 
false, it remains a moderately benign falsehood. For the most part, 
it conveys a fairly accurate picture of  eikasia, since it is true of  most 
occurrences of  eikasia and it entails what is the essential character­
istic of  all eikasia: that one forms one’s judgements on the basis of  
mere images alone.33
32 Thus, I agree with I. M. Crombie, An Examination of  Plato’s Doctrines, vol. ii: 
Plato on Knowledge and Reality (London, 1963), 76, that ‘eikasia seems to mean 
“having only an image to go on” ’. A parallel point can be made about Socrates’ 
inference, in Book 5, from his claim that, with respect to sensible and intelligible 
beauty, the cognitive state of  the lovers of  sights and sounds is a result of  their error 
of  thinking ‘that a likeness is not a likeness, but the thing itself  that it is like’ (τὸ 
ὅμοιόν τῳ μὴ ὅμοιον ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν, 476 c 4–5)—i.e. mistaking sens­
ibles for Forms—to the conclusion that they only have belief, not knowledge. While 
making this error is sufficient to restrict a person to belief, we should not assume 
that it is also a necessary condition of  belief. Many would agree, for example, that 
although philosophers are immune to this mistake, at least some of  their judge­
ments about the sensible world are beliefs.
33 This brings out the sharpest difference between my view and the view defended 
by Moss, ‘Assent’. Rather than simply being limited to their respective objects, 
Moss makes certain internalist criteria essential to pistis and eikasia: pistis is active 
affirmation, typically after reflection, about how things are; eikasia is passive ‘yield­
ing to’ appearances, without affirmation or denial. I think this misidentifies certain 
cases. For Moss, if  one brings the apparent/real distinction to bear on a question, 
and affirms something as one or the other, this is, ipso facto, pistis. But ordinary 
people do, in general, grasp the difference between real and apparent, and if  asked, 
they presumably would assert that (e.g.) pleasure really is, just as it appears, good. 
This leads to the strange result that pistis sometimes differs from eikasia simply by 
being a more brazen error: not just ‘pleasure is good’ (eikasia) but ‘pleasure really is, 
as it appears, good’ (pistis). A second problem is that Plato characterizes pistis solely 
by pointing us to its object: ‘that which it is like—that is, the animals around us, 
every plant .  .  .’ (6, 510 a 5–6). There is no suggestion that it requires a special 
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Two further clarifications are invited by the two occasions when 
Socrates explicitly describes the errors in the prisoners’ attitude to 
the shadows. Notably, on neither occasion does he say that they are 
simply mistaking them for the statues that cast them. The first is 
the following:
οὐ ταῦτα ἡγεῖ ἂν τὰ παριόντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομάζειν ἅπερ ὁρῷεν; (7, 515 
b 4–5)
Don’t you think they would assume that the names they used applied to 
the things [sc. the shadows] they see passing in front of  them?34
For example, if  a puppeteer carries a statue of  a wolf  along the 
wall, and a prisoner points at its shadow and says ‘a wolf  is running 
past’, he is misapplying the name ‘wolf ’ to the shadow. But notice 
that the name ‘wolf ’ most properly refers not to statues of  wolves, 
but to the real wolves running around outside the cave, which rep­
resent Forms.35 So we might think that they do not mistake images 
for sensible originals, but rather images for Forms. At this point, it 
is especially important to appreciate that eikasia is not any old 
error, but a fundamental epistemological concept defined in rela­
tion to Plato’s ontology. It is one of  the four measures in the Line 
and Cave of  how well or badly we grasp the relevant Form, the 
principal determinant of  which is whether we grasp the Form 
directly or indirectly through its instantiations. In this respect, 
eikasia is twice removed from the Form. The shadow of  a wolf  is 
attitude to animals and plants, like reflection or affirmation. Yet for Moss, many 
beliefs about animals and plants will be eikasia rather that pistis, since for her pistis 
is a kind of  active affirmation, which usually—she suspects always—follows explicit 
reflection (225–6). She recognizes that this means pistis will be rarer than we might 
think, but to make it so rare that it excludes many beliefs about sensible originals 
seems to contradict Socrates’ explicit characterization of  pistis (see n. 17 above).
34 For a compelling discussion of  the meaning and implications of  this line, see 
V. Harte, ‘Language in the Cave’, in D. Scott (ed.), Maieusis: Essays on Ancient 
Philosophy in Honour of  Myles Burnyeat (Oxford, 2007), 195–215. I follow Harte—
and presumably Reeve in his translation—in using Adam’s text over Slings’s; none­
theless, I think much the same point results from Slings’s text (cf. 515 b 7–9).
35 Compare the second error (which I will discuss shortly) of  thinking that ‘real­
ity is nothing other than the shadows’. Just like the prisoner’s error about names, 
this is, so to speak, two errors deep. Their error is to suppose that, for example, 
sensible images of  justice are the only candidates for what justice really is. But it 
would also be an error to suppose that just sensible originals—i.e. real sensible 
instances of  justice—are what justice really is, since this fails to acknowledge prop­
erly the Form of  justice (this latter error is the one that, in Book 5, the lovers of  
sights make about beauty).
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an image of  a statue of  a wolf  that is itself  an image of  a real wolf: 
eikasia’s object is a mere image of  a sensible that is itself  an image 
of  a Form. As Plato will describe them in Book 10, such images 
are ‘third place from the what is’ (τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος, 599 a 2). 
What is unique to eikasia is still the last step, mistaking mere images 
for their sensible originals, so we are not wrong to associate it with 
this. But we need also to recognize that eikasia is a way of  relating 
to the type of  fundamental facts that can only be properly under­
stood through knowledge of  Forms: facts concerning the nature 
of  things (like what piety is) and not, except perhaps derivatively, 
isolated empirical facts (like who mutilated the Hermai).
The second description of  the error is the following:
παντάπασι δή, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὰς τῶν 
σκευαστῶν σκιάς. (7, 515 c 1–2)
In every way, then, what the prisoners would take for reality is nothing 
other than the shadows of  the artefacts.
Everyone will occasionally mistake image and original, perhaps 
mistaking someone for their reflection in a hall of  mirrors. But 
even if  these are brief  episodes of  eikasia, they bear little similarity 
to the prisoners’ condition. If  I confuse someone with their reflec­
tion, I still know the difference between a person and a reflection; 
it is not, then, a mistake that affects my basic understanding of  the 
world. In contrast, the condition of  the prisoners leads them to 
make a general ontological error over and above any individual 
errors: believing that ‘reality is nothing other than the shadows’. 
Here the scope of  the Cave allegory matters a great deal.36 Since 
the prisoners’ condition represents ordinary people’s ethical eika-
sia, the lesson to draw is, adapting the sentence, that ordinary 
 people ‘in every way believe that ethical reality is nothing other 
than the mere appearances of  sensible ethical properties’. Not de 
dicto of  course: typically a person will not think that they are dealing 
with mere appearances any more than the prisoners think they are 
36 If  there is no limit to the Cave’s scope, then 515 c 1–2 would support D. W. 
Hamlyn’s claim that eikasia is ‘the state of  mind of  him who holds that sense­data 
or appearances are all that there is, who is unaware that or does not acknow ledge 
that there are also material objects’, ‘Eikasia in Plato’s Republic’ [‘Eikasia’], 
Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1958), 12–23 at 23.
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dealing with shadows.37 Rather, the implication is that, with respect 
to value properties, they do not recognize a distinction between 
what appears F and what is F. In other words, they assume that, as 
is indeed the case with many ordinary sensibles, what seems so is 
so: what seems good or just is good or just.
Finally, a note on error and truth. It is important not to confuse 
the distinction between pistis and eikasia with the distinction 
between true and false belief. Only some false beliefs result from 
the error of  treating images as originals, and there is no reason to 
think that there are not some true beliefs about sensible images 
(whether recognized as such or not). Similarly, there are many false 
things that can be believed about sensible originals, even when rec­
ognizing them as such. The temptation to identify eikasia with 
false belief  comes from its strong association with error. All belief—
both pistis and eikasia—is open to error (only knowledge is in fal lible 
(ἀναμαρτήτῳ, 5, 477 e 7–8)). But eikasia makes a person especially 
prone to error, for at least two reasons. A general reason is that images 
of  F things represent F­ness even less completely and accurately 
than sensible F things, which already have their flaws. A particular 
reason is that widespread ethical error is caused by the especially 
sharp disparity between appearance and reality in the evaluative 
domain (as I emphasized in Section 2.3), which makes pistis 
 considerably more accurate in this domain.
3.2. The shadow-spotting competition
One lesson from the preceding is that the prisoners’ error is not a 
departure from the norms that govern their everyday cognition, 
but an error that shapes those norms. This leads me to the second 
major claim of  this paper: eikasia should not be identified with the 
isolated error of  mistaking an image for an original, but with a kind 
of  cognitive activity that someone is compelled to engage in when 
37 The exception would be the ‘enlightened’ eikasia mentioned earlier, where one 
recognizes that one is limited to images but trusts them anyway. Such a person 
could be compared to someone who knows that a reflection of  a person is different 
from a person, yet who does not know how it differs, since they have only experi­
enced people­reflections. Notice that even someone with enlightened eikasia would 
believe and act as if ‘reality is nothing other than the shadows’ and, crucially, since 
they assume images are accurate, they would make the same general error: they 
assume that when it comes to value properties, what seems so is so.
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they only have a perceptual, image­confined access to the world. In 
particular, I propose that it is the kind of  cognition that we get a 
glimpse of  in the following passage, in which Socrates describes 
the returning philosopher’s attitude to a sort of  shadow­spotting 
competition that preoccupies the prisoners:
τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ’ ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα, τῷ ὀξύτατα 
καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ 
ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένῳ 
τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ’ 
ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας . . . ; (7, 516 c 8–d 4)
If  there had been any honours, praises, or prizes among them for the one 
who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by and who 
best remembered which usually came earlier, which later, and which 
simultaneously, and who could thus best divine what’s going to happen, do 
you think that our man would desire these rewards or envy those among 
the prisoners who were honoured and held power?
My claim is that we should identify this cognitive activity with 
eikasia. An obvious and compelling reason to do so is that it is the 
cognitive activity of  people in a condition that is typically thought 
to represent eikasia.38 If  that is right, then mistaking shadows for 
originals is only a small part of  what is distinctive about the prison­
ers’ cognition. This is, on reflection, unsurprising. The prisoners 
conduct their whole lives in the cave. Plato describes them holding 
court cases, debating justice, competing for positions of  power, and 
condemning people to death—and doing all these ethical charged 
activities through the medium of  shadows. This suggests a kind of  
ethical thinking that is comprehensively shaped by the fact that 
they are limited to images, and the shadow­spotting competition is 
our best insight into what this might be. However, while Plato is 
clearly describing something specific and distinctive, it is not obvious 
38 I assume that this is a cognitive activity practised by all prisoners. It might be 
objected that the reference to ‘those among the prisoners who were honoured and 
held power’ suggests a narrower application, perhaps to something unique to politi­
cians and poets. I have two reasons for a broader application. First, the honours go 
to those among the whole group of  prisoners (the subject is still the ‘fellow­prison­
ers’; συνδεσμώται, 516 c 5) who are sharpest at shadow­spotting (ὀξύτατα καθορᾷν, 
516 c 9), which implies that the others engage in shadow­spotting, but with less 
laudable sharpness. Second, the skills described seem to be essential life skills for 
anyone confined to shadows: it is hard to imagine a prisoner functioning without 
some capacity for identifying, remembering, and anticipating the only objects 
they know.
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what it is. We can see that it involves identifying and anticipating 
shadows by making guesses that are based on what we remember, 
and we can also see that it is analogous to some activity or activities 
for which people receive honours, rewards, and power. But where 
can we go from here?
Consider first the word itself, eikasia. In the Line analogy, Plato 
mostly uses existing words as placeholders for the new kinds of  
cognition he is describing: pistis, dianoia, and noēsis.39 But eikasia is 
the exception, being much rarer and possibly a Platonic neolo­
gism.40 So Plato presumably chose ‘eikasia’ because he thought it 
was apt. A little reflection makes it clear why. The objects of  the 
lowest section of  the Line are eikones, ‘images’ or ‘likenesses’, and 
Plato wishes to name a kind of  cognition relating to these. The 
natural place to look is the cognate verb, eikazein: if  eikones are the 
object of  cognition, eikazein is a good place to look for the manner 
in which they are cognized. Eikazein has a variety of  related mean­
ings: to represent by an image (thus, to paint: 2, 377 e 1); to com­
pare or liken (as when Meno likens Socrates to a torpedo fish, Meno 
80 c 4); or to infer, imagine, or guess something (Meno 89 e 2; Sym. 
190 a 4). If  there is an active side to eikasia—something it does 
with images—activities such as likening, imagining, and guessing 
are excellent candidates. They also do a good job of  describing 
what is happening in the shadow­spotting competition: the prison­
ers identify passing shadows and make guesses or conjectures 
about what is or will be the case (they ‘divine what’s going to hap­
pen’) by likening them with memories of  previous correlations 
they’ve seen (‘which usually came earlier, which later, and which 
simultaneously’).41
39 He even warns us against placing any weight on the specific words he has 
 chosen: 7, 533 d 6–9.
40 I find two near­contemporary uses, though neither is free from Plato’s sphere 
of  influence. In the spurious Platonic dialogue Sisyphus, it is used to describe a 
certain bad type of  practical deliberation; Gallop translates ‘guesswork’ (390 c 7). 
In Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates describes painting as ‘representation of  the 
visible’ (εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων, 3. 10. 1. 5). An example of  later uses is Plutarch’s 
Themistocles, 29. 3, where it has a clear meaning of  likeness or comparison and, 
consonantly, in Demetrius, On Style, a manual on rhetoric, it is used in an appar­
ently technical sense for ‘simile’ (2. 80. 5).
41 For similar views of  the connection between eikasia and eikazein (though not 
necessarily similar conclusions), see Nettleship, Lectures, 241; Robinson, Dialectic, 
203; Hamlyn, ‘Eikasia’, 19–20, who also connects it to the prisoners’ shadow­spotting; 
and Wilberding, ‘Puppeteers’, 130. Adam, Republic (in contrast to his editor, 
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This is satisfying, but speculative. For firmer ground, we need to 
look at what the prisoners are actually doing. Clearly a central skill in 
the shadow­spotting is the ability to draw conjectural judgements 
from comparisons with previously experienced shadows: identifying 
present shadows and predicting future ones. A natural hypothesis, 
then, is that it represents a kind of cognition that draws conclusions 
about images by some purely empirical means, such as comparison 
and inductive conjecture. Though if  it is a bona fide kind of reason­
ing, it must be one about which Plato has (like his returning pris­
oner) a low opinion: we are not thinking of  reliable, scientific 
induction, but something more haphazard and conjectural.
I think that we can make best sense of  this passage if  we consider 
it alongside a number of  other passages in which Plato draws a 
contrast between, on the one hand, reason and art, and, on the 
other, ‘mere experience’ (ἐμπει ρία).42 The two most striking pas­
sages are in the Gorgias and Philebus. Although they appear in 
quite different philosophical contexts, from the Republic and each 
other, they have a relevance that speaks for itself, not least because 
all three appear to be attempts to describe the same thing: the low­
est kind of  cognitive activity in which humans typically engage.43
In the Gorgias, Socrates describes a low class of  activities— 
including rhetoric, sophistry, pastry baking, and cosmetics—that 
fall short of  being genuine arts:
κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν ϕύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε 
τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησ αμένη, τριβῇ 
Rees: xxxvii) believes that ‘the translation “conjecture” is misleading, for conjecture 
implies conscious doubt or hesitation, and doubt is foreign to eikasia in Plato’s 
sense’. It is true that eikasia is closely related to a failure to doubt specifically that 
what appears to be the case is the case—but not to a failure to doubt as such.
42 The ‘mere’ is important: it is experience on its own that Plato is discussing here. 
It is easy to caricature Plato, especially if  used as a foil to Aristotle, as an arch 
rationalist who hubristically ignored the role of  experience in practical knowledge. 
But that is inaccurate. The importance of  experience, as a supplement to reason and 
understanding, is a major theme in the Republic. A sufficient (though far from the 
only) example is the role experience plays at both ends of  the Guardians’ education: 
their early education in music, poetry, and gymnastics and the fifteen years of  prac­
tical experience—more than is devoted to either mathematics or dialectic—that they 
must do so that ‘they won’t be inferior with respect to ἐμπειρία’ (7, 539 e 3–6).
43 The Gorgias and Philebus passages often come up in discussions of  Plato’s view 
of  empeiria, though not Rep. 7, 516 c 8–d 4. A notable exception is C. Balla, ‘Early 
Forerunners of  Medical Empiricism’ [‘Medical Empiricism’], Φιλοσοϕία, 48 (2018), 
253–80, who draws on all three passages, though in the context of  a reading very 
different from my own.
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καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σῳζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται 
τὰς ἡδονάς. (501 a 4–b 1)
It proceeds towards its object in an entirely artless way, without having at 
all examined either the nature or cause of  pleasure. It does so completely 
non­rationally [ἀλόγως], with virtually no discrimination. Through habit 
and experience [τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ] it merely preserves the memory of  what 
usually happens and that is how it procures pleasures.
In the Philebus, Socrates presents a hierarchy remarkably reminis­
cent of  the Divided Line (Phileb. 55 c–59 d): he ranks kinds of  arts 
in order of  purity (τὸ καθαρόν) or clarity (τὸ σαϕές), where the low­
est includes rhetoric, music, and poetry; the highest is the philo­
sophical art of  dialectic; and mathematical arts lie in between. We 
are interested in his description of  the lowest:
ΣΩ.  Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἄν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ 
στατικήν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ϕαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἑκάστης ἂν γίγνοιτο.
ΠΡΩ.  Φαῦλον μὲν δή.
ΣΩ.  Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ’ εἰκάζειν λείποιτ’ ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν 
ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν 
ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας. 
(Phileb. 55 e 1–56 a 1)
soc:  If  someone were to take away all counting, measuring, and weigh­
ing from the arts, the rest might be said to be worthless.
phil:  Worthless, indeed!
soc:  All we would have left would be conjecture [εἰκάζειν] and the training 
of our perceptions through experience and habit [ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι 
τριβῇ]. We would have to rely on the ability to make guesses that many 
people call art, once it has acquired strength through exercise and toil.
All three passages describe a similar kind of  cognition. First, it is 
empirical: at least at its most rudimentary, it seems to be the ability 
to repeat what is remembered, in particular a remembered pleas­
ure. (While memory is not explicitly mentioned in the Philebus 
passage, it was earlier defined as the ‘preservation of  perception’ 
(σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως, Phileb. 34 a 10–11), so it can reasonably be 
assumed to be involved in the ‘training of  our perceptions’.) 
Second, it is ‘non­rational’ in the sense that it does not use reason­
ing (like ‘counting, measuring, and weighing’) or seek understand­
ing (it doesn’t examine ‘the nature or cause of  pleasure’). Thus, it 
appears to be a kind of  empirical, non­rational ability we have 
when we rely solely on ‘habit’ and ‘experience’, τριβή and ἐμπειρία: 
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a combination that we find often in Plato, almost always as a con­
trast to a genuine technē.44 If  there is any difference between them, 
perhaps τριβή, ‘habit’, emphasizes repetition (literally it means rub­
bing) and ἐμπειρία, ‘experience’, emphasizes a previous acquaint­
ance, both of  which capture aspects of  what we mean when we talk 
about ‘learning by experience’.
It is worth examining Plato’s view of  memory more closely. 
Something that stands out in the passages from the Republic and 
Gorgias is that they talk about using a memory of  what ‘usually’ or 
‘typically’ happens. We can’t literally have a memory of  what typ­
ic al ly happens, since nothing is typical of  a single occasion. So the 
relevant ‘memory’ must be either a series of  memories or, more 
likely, some kind of  synthesis of  such memories: a series of  mem­
or ies of  glass breaking, for example, seems to fall short of  remem­
bering that glass is fragile. (I take it that it is for reasons such as this 
that Aristotle introduces what he calls ‘experience’ as a separate 
kind of  cognition in this role: ‘in human beings experience comes 
about from memory; for many memories of  the same thing bring 
about the power of  one experience.’)45
But even if  we say that he is describing a kind of  cognition drawn 
from a series of  memories, this still leaves open a wide range of  
possibilities. At its most sophisticated, it could be a judgement that 
is the conclusion of  an explicit inductive inference, perhaps even 
with accurate estimates of  the probabilities involved. At its most 
rudimentary, it might be a mere disposition to act in a certain way 
born from a habituated response to the repetition of  similar experi­
ences. So far, then, the possibilities range over everything from the 
work of  an empirical scientist to a lion salivating when it sees a 
deer. Which of  these is representative of  Plato’s view?
I believe the answer is, in a way, both. We might think that the 
decisive evidence is Plato’s description of  what he is referring to as 
something ‘non­rational’ (ἄλογος), and a result of  mere habit and 
the ‘training of  our perception’. This certainly seems to favour the 
salivating lion over the empirical scientist. But we need to be cau­
tious here. We should not assume that Plato’s experience/reason 
44 E.g. Gorg. 463 b 3–4 (οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ’ ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή), Phaedo 270 b 6–7 
(μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀλλὰ τέχνῃ), and Leg. 11, 936 a 4 (εἴτ’ οὖν τέχνη εἴτε ἄτεχνός 
ἐστίν τις ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή).
45 Metaph. 1. 1, 980 b 28–981 a 1: γίγνεται δ’ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· 
αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. See also 
Post. An. 2. 19, 100 a 3–9.
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dichotomy aligns with our own. In particular, his attitude to in duct­
ive reasoning seems very far from ours. It is not even clear that Plato 
recognized inductive inference as a bona fide kind of  reason ing at 
all.46 He might, then, consider mere experience to be non­rational 
and yet include in it activities that we would characterize as reason­
ing. Certainly judging on the basis of  which things ‘usually came 
earlier, which later, and which simultaneously’ brings to mind 
something like inductive reasoning, and this impression is strength­
ened by the fact that it is said to be the experiential method of  cer­
tain arts, especially if  these include, as is claimed in the Philebus, 
arts like ‘medicine, agriculture, navigation, and strategy’ (56 b 1–2).
Medicine gives us some further clues. There was to be, and to a 
limited extent may already have been, a debate about whether 
medicine can rely on experience alone (as Plato implies in the 
Philebus) or also needs theoretical accounts that go beyond experi­
ence.47 However, those who came to be called the ‘Empiricists’ 
(ἐμπειρικοί) in this debate describe a form of  empirical thought 
very different from our own: not only do they embrace a descrip­
tion of  medicine’s method centred on memorizing and associating 
experiences, but they combined it with a conception of  reason that 
is as narrow as Plato’s seems to be, and crucially doesn’t leave space 
for any kind of  inductive reasoning. Michael Frede, for example, 
describes them as follows:
They defend the view that we can account for our technical beliefs and 
even for our technical knowledge solely in terms of  the senses and mem­
ory . . . To claim this seems to presuppose a particular conception of  reason 
which is different from ours, a conception on which it is not true by defi n ition 
that anything we would call ‘inference’ or ‘reasoning’ will be a function of  
46 The best candidate for a counter­example is the Socratic epagōge ̄, though many 
doubt that this involves inductive inference. M. L. McPherran, ‘Socratic epagōge ̄ 
and Socratic Induction’, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, 45 (2007), 347–64, 
gives an excellent survey of  the debate, himself  concluding that many are indeed 
probabilistic inferences. Without suggesting that it addresses McPherran’s many 
careful arguments, I think it is important to recognize that the epagōge ̄ can be per­
suasive (rather than purely explanatory) even if  it is not an inductive inference. It 
strikes me that Socrates often appeals to sets of  examples neither for empirical sup­
port nor purely for illustration. The aim is often to make a common property in a 
set of  examples salient to an interlocutor, as a step towards persuading them of  a 
general claim that involves this property (I think something like this is also going on 
in McPherran’s example of  Polit. 277 c–278 c).
47 The debate is Hellenistic, but for a discussion of its antecedents and how they 
might have interacted with Plato’s and Aristotle’s views, see Balla, ‘Medical Empiricism’.
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reason. It rather seems to be a view which attributes some or all functions 
of  reason, to the extent that it recognises them, to memory.48
Frede sees the ancestors of this view in the fifth and fourth century 
bce, where we find, on the one hand, a narrow and austere conception 
of the work of reason, and, on the other, a correspondingly broad 
conception of the work of perception, memory, and other perceptual 
abilities.49 With respect to the latter, it might be thought that Plato is 
less generous to our perceptual abilities than this, since he clearly 
thinks of experience as a low kind of cognition, typical of lower or 
even pseudo­arts, and even as a source of error in ethical thought. But 
if  we set aside his critical tone, we can see that he is also allowing 
experience considerable achievements: the pastry chef makes tasty 
pastries and the farmer’s crops grow (sometimes ancient doctors even 
healed). This is more than the kind of mindless or animalistic ac tiv­
ities that we might expect from pure memory and perception.
We find, then, that Plato has a consistent story to tell about the 
lowest kind of  human cognition, one that makes it, from a modern 
perspective, a mixture of  primitive and sophisticated: it relies only 
on the kind of  perceptual abilities that we can imagine sharing with 
animals, and yet involves something that is at least a close cousin of  
inductive reasoning. With this in mind, it seems highly likely that 
when Plato describes the prisoners’ identifying, remembering pat­
terns between, and predicting shadows, he is representing the 
manner in which anyone confined to images forms more complex 
judgements, beyond simple assent to images. This makes it espe­
cially clear that eikasia represents not an isolated error, but a com­
prehensive way of  cognitively engaging with images, just as dianoia 
and noēsis are comprehensive ways of  reasoning about their objects.
3.3. Eikasia without reason
Eikasia has turned out to be a perceptual and—in a specific Platonic 
sense—unreasoning kind of  cognition that plays a key role in 
explaining ethical error. It should not come as too much of  a 
48 M.  Frede, ‘An Empiricist View of  Knowledge: Memorism’, in S.  Everson 
(ed.), Epistemology, Companions to Ancient Thought, vol. i (Cambridge, 1990), 
225–50 at 226.
49 Lorenz presents his book The Brute Within as a study of  the antecedents of  the 
Hellenistic Empiricist/Rationalist debate in Plato and Aristotle, and in this respect 
it largely corroborates the distinction drawn here.
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surprise, then, that my final claim is that eikasia is a kind of  cogni­
tion available to (not exclusive to) the non­rational parts of  the 
soul.50 One reason to think that this is so, and possibly a sufficient 
reason, is simply that eikasia has turned out to be extremely similar 
to what we would expect non­rational cognition to look like for 
Plato, at least according to some recent interpretations of  the lat­
ter.51 But we see a further and more direct reason when we look 
again at the passage described briefly earlier (Section 2.2) in which 
Socrates examines a putative opposition in the soul that arises 
when we use reasoning to see through an optical illusion.
As we saw earlier, there are close connections between the 
Republic’s discussion of  eikasia and its discussion of  imitation in 
Book 10. Both are discussions of  ‘images’ or ‘appearances’ that 
emphasize their low place in Plato’s ontological hierarchy: they are 
mere images of  sensibles that are, in turn, mere images of  Forms. 
Equally, both emphasize how appearances are epistemologically 
unreliable in a way that has serious consequences in ethics: images 
give us incomplete and distorted views of  the world, yet they are 
sufficiently persuasive to fool the ordinary person who assumes 
that what appears so, is so. Consequently, most people’s ethical 
beliefs are deeply flawed. Unlike Books 6 and 7, however, Book 10 
adds an explicit account of  the psychological effect of  images, 
beginning in the argument from optical illusions. The argument 
aims to show that images exert their power on the non­rational 
parts of  our soul. Socrates asserts that when we reason our way out 
of  an optical illusion, there remains a cognitive conflict in the soul: 
we have one belief  agreeing with the sensory image (e.g. that a par­
tially immersed stick is bent) and another belief  that results from 
reasoning, which recognizes that the image is false (e.g. that in real­
ity the stick is straight). Thus, the first belief  confuses image for 
reality and the other reaches the real state of  affairs behind the 
image—one is set over a sensible image, the other over a sensible 
original. If  it were not for the unusual context, with both beliefs 
occurring at the same time in the same soul, we would hardly need 
50 Others who have made this claim include C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: 
The Argument of  Plato’s Republic (Princeton, NJ, 1988), 139, and Moss, ‘Assent’ and 
‘Pleasure and Illusion in Plato’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72 
(2006), 503–35 at 522.
51 For example, Lorenz, Brute.
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a second glance to see that the first is an example of  eikasia and the 
second of  pistis.52
But this is surely the right reading. Notice that the belief  attrib­
uted to a non­rational part doesn’t obey the norms that usually 
govern beliefs, but is instead so firmly rooted in appearances that it 
fails to update even when the believer has decisive evidence that 
the appearance is false, and it persists even while being overtly 
contra dict ed by another belief  that does follow this evidence. Plato 
is not simply pointing out two token beliefs, but marking a distinc­
tion between two kinds of  belief, where the uniquely non­rational 
kind is defined by its inability to listen to reason and, thus, its reli­
ance on, and implicit trust in, the evidence of  images. So both this 
argument and the Line divide belief  into two kinds, and they make 
essentially the same point: one kind of  belief  goes beyond mere 
images, but the other invariably takes them at face value, and is in 
this way trapped—imprisoned—by them. The only significant dif­
ference is that in Book 10, the lower kind of  belief  is held by a non­
rational part of  the soul.53
While Books 6 and 7, in contrast, do not explicitly attempt to 
integrate the Republic’s psychology, we do get a telling glimpse of  
Plato’s position. During his commentary on the Cave allegory, 
Socrates tells us that education can turn the intellect in the right 
direction only if  it turns it ‘together with the whole soul’ (σὺν ὅλῃ 
τῇ ψυχῇ, 7, 518 c 4–d 1)—that is, together with the non­rational 
parts of  the soul. Thus, as a prerequisite for intellectual education, 
a person must possess the non­intellectual virtues that are acquired 
52 There is also an interesting similarity to our Philebus passage, 55 e 1–56 a 1: 
there, the lowest cognition was what was left when we ‘take away all counting, meas­
uring, and weighing’; here it is what we get when a part of  us is unable to use ‘meas­
uring, counting, and weighing’ (τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι; Rep. 10, 602 d 6).
53 Moss, ‘Assent’, 222–7, uses this argument, 602 c 4–603 a 8, as the primary 
source in her account of  eikasia and pistis. See also Paton, ‘Eikasia’, 86. My use of  
this passage differs in two ways. First, I do not take it to be paradigmatic. Plato’s 
goal is not to describe eikasia or pistis, but to establish a conclusion about imitative 
art, so it is not always possible to generalize. For example, I think pistis is rarely 
either a result of  explicit reasoning or a response to a problematic perception (see n. 
32 above). Second, as I interpret it, 602 c–603 a does not support the conclusion 
that eikasia involves no affirmation or denial. Since this is not asserted in the pas­
sage, it would have to be implicit in the argument it makes. But in fact the argument 
appeals to beliefs that are strongly opposed to each other in the way required for the 
principle of  opposites to apply (602 e 8–9), and as such we would expect them to be 
symmetrical: that is, not an active and a passive attitude, but opposing attitudes of  
the same kind, such as affirming (or denying) both p and not­p.
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though ‘habit and practices’ (ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν, 518 d 11).54 A purely 
intellectual education would produce a character who is vicious, 
but clever (519 a 2), about whom Socrates tells us:
τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ϕύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτό μενον 
περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἳ δὴ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ 
τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσϕυεῖς γιγνόμεναι περικάτω στρέϕουσι τὴν 
τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν, ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν περιεστρέϕετο εἰς τὰ ἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ 
αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀξύτατα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐϕ’ ἃ νῦν τέτραπται. 
(7, 519 a 7–b 5)
If  a nature of  this sort had been hammered straight from childhood and 
freed from the leaden weights of  kinship with becoming, which have 
been fastened to it by feasting, greed, and other such pleasures and which 
turn the soul’s vision downwards—if, being rid of  these weights, it 
turned to look at the true things, then I say that the same soul of  the 
same person would see these most sharply, just as it does the things it is 
now turned towards. (Emphasis mine)
This is a remarkable yet often unnoticed passage: it is the only 
place where Plato tells us what the prisoners’ chains symbolize, 
and it strongly suggests that they represent an intellectual con­
straint imposed by intemperate non­rational passions. It is well 
recognized that for Plato, undisciplined non­rational parts can dis­
tort a person’s rational cognition—for example, by inclining them 
towards false beliefs that conform with their intemperate pas­
sions.55 Exactly how this should be spelt out is a complex in ter pret­
ive question, but we can at least say that it makes sense to expect 
that what explains why the non­rational passions are themselves 
misled—they are passions of  parts of  the soul confined to eikasia, 
and, thus, to unreliable images—will help explain how they, in 
turn, cause a person to have false beliefs. A plausible explanation is 
that intemperate passions, guided by certain images, incline a per­
son to take at face value those same images, and, correspondingly, 
make denying those images painful and difficult, since it entails 
denying the satisfaction of  the passions. For example, the decent 
person in Book 10, after a loss, tries to resist his non­rational desire 
to grieve dramatically, since despite the fact that it appears satisfying 
54 I argue that this is the right way to read this difficult passage in my ‘The Soul­
Turning Metaphor in Republic Book 7’ (in progress).
55 See e.g. D. Scott, ‘Platonic Pessimism and Moral Education’, Oxford Studies 
in Ancient Philosophy, 17 (1999), 15–36.
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and cathartic, he trusts the arguments that tell him it would do 
more harm than good; but if  the passion is very strong, and resist­
ing it requires great effort, this can cause him to give up his earlier 
arguments and assent to the false image of  grief. Thus, his existing 
non­rational acceptance of  the false image leads his rational part to 
endorse it. Or, in other words, the eikasia of  the non­rational parts 
of  his soul leads him to lapse into a more widespread eikasia. For 
most people who are, in contrast to the decent person, more fully 
ruled by one of  their non­rational parts, this effect will be more 
comprehensive and will face less, if  any, resistance. This gives us a 
way to interpret the prisoners’ chains: their intemperate passions 
keep their cognition to the low level of  eikasia, which accords with 
the passions’ continued satisfaction.
Plato’s account of  eikasia has turned out to be thoroughly inte­
grated into the connected theoretical concerns of  the Republic, 
including its epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. This is 
important not only because integration is intrinsically desirable, 
but also because it does justice to its presentation in the Line and 
the Cave, which are images that in all other respects present a 
remarkably comprehensive and unified vision of  the Republic’s 
project. This is especially clear when we look at the prisoners of  
the Cave allegory. It is true that ordinary people may lack ethical 
knowledge and often uncritically accept what they are told—claims 
hardly unique to Plato—but this does not explain the very specific 
situation of  the prisoners or the deep pessimism it embodies. In 
contrast, the reading I’ve defended shows that the Cave allegory 
carries a concrete message that explains, as the allegory appears to 
promise it will, why it is necessary for some of  us to ‘leave the cave’ 
and acquire knowledge: when it comes to ethical questions, or din­
ary people are constrained—in part, as we just saw, by non­rational 
pressures—to a rudimentary empirical kind of  thought, called 
eikasia, that cannot reach beyond how things sensibly appear; since 
this leads to inadequate beliefs about such all­important things as 
goodness and justice, untutored ethical beliefs are insufficient, and 
ethical knowledge is necessary.56
Koç University
56 I am grateful to Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi, Robert Howton, Jessica Moss, Henry 
Shevlin, and Nicholas Smith for helpful discussions and/or comments on earlier 
drafts of  this paper. I would also like to thank Victor Caston and the anonymous 
readers of  this paper for their many constructive suggestions.
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